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Abstract 
This paper examines whether systematic equity risk of Canadian firms as 
measured by beta from Capital Asset Pricing Model, reflects the risk of firm’s defined 
benefit pension plan. The foremost reason for this study is due to the opaque set of 
accounting report for pension asset, liability and expenses. Pension asset and liability 
are kept off balance sheet and are regarded as a separate entity from the rest of the 
firm. As the equity market and long term interest rate deteriorates, and longevity of 
people increases in past decade, the risk of pension can be detrimental to the 
company’s financial health as a whole. Panel based models are used in testing the 
relationship between the firm risk and pension risk The empirical finding in this paper 
highlighted a direct relationship between the two. It also shows implication for 
corporate finance practise in the determination of the cost of capital. The standard 
procedure of measure of cost of capital or for operating assets tend to overestimate the 
cost of capital which put upward pressure on the discount rate for capital budgeting. 
 
 
Keywords:  Defined benefit pension plan; pension risk; equity risk; pension 
accounting; cost of capital 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we examine the empirical question of whether real-world equity 
return reflects the risk of corporate pension plans. We focus on the systemic risk of 
firms and use beta from capital asset pricing model (CAPM) as the measure of the 
risk. Since 2001 downturn in global equity market and a decline in long term interest 
rate have negatively affected pension asset and liability. The value of pension assets 
went down and the amount of liability increase as the discount rate declines. The 
pension liability grows even faster when the workforce substantially ages for baby 
boomers and longevity of people improved. Therefore, it is critical for corporate 
decision makers and regulators to incorporate the pension risk into equity risk. With 
the expansion of pension plan and accounting standards, plan sponsors must make 
well informed decision on asset allocation and funding target by correctly estimating 
pension risk on both asset and liability sides. Numerous empirical studies have been 
done on the relationship between pension risk and firm risk in UK and US. Their 
empirical finding supports direct relationship between the two. 
However, the question of whether pension risk and pension value in Canada are 
reflected in the equity risk of Canadian firms has never been examined. The 
uniqueness about this paper is that we break down the time period from 2000 to 2005 
and from 2006 to 2008. The two time periods characterize different economic 
condition. 2000-2005 is characterized by perfect storm highlighted by low asset return 
and long term interest rates. During 2006-2008, the credit crunch caused big crash in 
Page 8 of 25 
 
the equity market and volatility in the stock market is aggravated. By looking at 
financial crisis along, the paper provides recommendation for policy makers how to 
regulate in this environment in terms of pension risk management. Therefore, we are 
motivated to write the paper with a focus on Canadian firms in order to give empirical 
support to our argument. 
 The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the relating literatures 
and provides overview of the Canadian DB pension plan and trends, and pension 
accounting risk exposures. Section 3 presents data source, control variables and 
statistical summary. In Section 4, we derive the company’s operating beta from the 
firm’s equity risk as measured by beta from the capital asset pricing model, pension 
asset beta and pension liability beta. Section 5 shows empirical evidence on the 
relation between pension risk and firm risk from panel data, cross-sectional regression 
and Fama Macbeth regression and interpretation of the results. In Section 6, we 
present our summary on the results, analysis and our suggestion on further 
development in this area for Canadian firms.  
2 Literature Review  
A number of empirical studies include Oldfield (1977), Feldstein and Seligman 
(1981), Feldstein and Morck (1983), Gersovitz (1980) and Westerfield. These 
researches provided the empirical evidence about the market valuation of pension 
liabilities, in which they used the standard crossing–sectional valuation models and 
techniques. In a controversy, Modigliani-Cohn(1977), Summers (1981) and French, 
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Ruback and Schwert(1983) studied the effects of inflation on firm’s nominal assets 
and liabilities. Feldstein and Morck(1982) also explored how firms’ unfunded pension 
liabilities obligation affect the market value of firms. Jin and Merton (2006) examined 
the question of whether equity risk of US firm can reflect the risk of their pension 
plan with capital asset pricing model (CAPM). Their finding indicates that equity beta 
do appear to reflect both beta of firms’ pension asset and liabilities accurately in US 
capital market.  
2.1 Defined Benefit Pension Plan Profile 
(Zvi Bodie, John B. Shoven, 1987) Defined benefit pension funds are segregated 
pools of capital that collateralize the future liabilities explicit (and perhaps implicit) in 
defined benefit plans. Viewed from traditional perspective, pension funds are entirely 
separate from the corporation and its shareholders and should be managed without 
regard to either corporate financial policy or the interests of the corporation and its 
shareholders. Recently, an alternative perspective regarding pension decision on 
overall corporate financial policy is that defined benefit liabilities are fixed financial 
liabilities of the firm. Pension assets on the other hand are the assets of the firm in that 
the surplus and deficit belong to the firm’s shareholders.  
2.2 Canadian DB Pension Plan Overview 
Unlike other developed country such as United States and United Kingdom, 
Canada’s Constitution has given authority over pension standards to sub national 
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jurisdiction(Gretchen Van Riesen,2009). Two levels of jurisdiction govern private 
pension plans – tax and minimum standards (Van Riesen2009). The federal level 
deals with tax deferral/tax shelter limits, while provincial jurisdictions establish 
minimum standards for design, funding and administration. Three pillars are in the 
system. CPP, a universal public retirement income plan, provides direct government 
subsidies to seniors for the purpose of securing a minimal standard of living including 
the federal Old Age Security (OAS) and Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS) and 
other similar provincial programs. Private contribution-based savings plans are formal 
plans, such as Registered Retirement Savings Plan (RRSP) or some other financial 
products which is independently contributed by individuals or through their 
employers. Private defined-benefit pension is the third pillar that provides members 
with a regular financial benefit at retirement. Many large companies, as well as 
federal, provincial and municipal public services, offer such pension plans to their 
workers (Jay Makarenko, 2010).  
2.3 Risk and DB Plan’s Current Status 
In recent years, many Canadian DB pension funds have become underfunded as 
due to a downturn in global equity market and a decline in long term interest rates. As 
the workforce substantially ages in Canada, pension liability growth kept pace. 
Consequently, the funded status of DB pension plans did not improve (Purcell, 2005). 
Not only has the estimated number of deficit DB plans not improved, but the 
magnitude of the aggregate deficit has swelled significantly (Rock Lefebvre, 2005). 
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Table 1 shows how pension funded status in Canada deteriorated over years and 
underfunded amounts have been increased from 2001 to 2007.  
Table 1: Funded Status for Canadian Plans (2000-2007) 
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2.4 Accounting Risk exposure and trends 
Because companies make contributions to defined contribution plans as the 
expense arises, no liabilities accrue for that type of plan. However a liability from DB 
plan does accrue and thus must be measured and reported. (CGA 2003) The highly 
criticised accounting rule of expected return on plan assets and the various smoothing 
mechanism is that it leaves billions of dollars worth of pension deficits off-balance 
sheet. Because the firm report the expected return on plan assets, any difference 
between the actual return and expected return and gains and losses in the DB plan can 
be pushed off balance sheet and amortized only when the unrecognized gains or loss 
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grows larger than 10% of the plan assets (The magic of pension accounting). Pension 
accounting is complex and it has been long debated. Regulators and analysts advocate 
a transparent method that funded status of pension plan can be truly reflected in the 
company’s balance sheet. But fear that excessive pension liability booked on the 
balance sheet will affect company’s real economic decision and push down 
company’s stock price. Due to all the inappropriateness in the pension accounting 
rules, it makes apparent that the DB pension plan sponsored company’s financial 
statement and conditions can be misrepresented. 
3. Data and measurement of variables 
In This section, we discuss our sample and the construction of variables. Table 2 
shows a list of control variables and detailed procedure to construct them, and the 
procedure to estimate pension asset betas is presented in the appendix. 
Table 2
List of control variables
Variable Calculation
Market share by value share price* number of outstanding shares
Book to market ratio book value of firm/market value of firm
Return on investment Net income/total assets  
The data are downloaded from COMPUSTAT and Bloomberg for 140 Canadian 
firms from 2000 to 2008. Because of lack of uniformity in minimum standards in 
Canadian pension plan, pension legislations and provisions are different across 
provinces. We focuses on DB pension plan reported in COMPUSTAT. Majority of 
firms are from Ontario province, some firms are from other provinces but all the plans 
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have to comply with reporting standard. COMPUSTAT reports two different 
measures of pension liability: the Accumulated Benefit Obligation (ABO) and 
Projected Benefit Obligation (PBO). We use ABO as a measure to Canadian pension 
liability since ABO contains more data for Canadian firms. If ABO is not available, 
we use PBO multiply by 0.9565, which is the sample mean ratio of ABO/PBO.  
Variable Number of observation Mean
Standard 
deviation
Quantile1 Median Quantile3
Equity beta 7280 0.609 0.6705 0.4615 0.7182 0.98
Firm risk 7280 0.5997 0.3168 0.3199 0.5152 0.7253
Pension risk 7280 0.0525 0.072 0.0016 0.0819 0.0608
Table 3
Summary statistics
Equity beta is downloaded from Bloomberg and it is daily adjusted return. Beta for pension 
asset 0.576 is estimated by weighted average of aggregate pension assets on each asset 
category from 1996 to 2008. The firm risk is                             , and pension risk is                               
where βPL is assumed to be equal to 0.175.
E D E D
E D
E D E D
    
 
pension PA PL
PA PL
E D E D
   
 
 
The summary of statistics of our sample is reported in Table 3. It shows large 
variation in the equity beta. Pension risk (pension asset risk minus pension liability 
risk) demonstrates very low standard deviation.  
4. Background and Methodology 
4.1 Background 
In Canada, when a company sponsors a defined-benefit pension plan, the plan’s 
assets and liability, although segregated, are assets and liability of the company. To 
simply the method, we assume there are no tax and insurance effects. We follow Jin, 
Bodie and Merton (2006) to derive the relations between pension plan risk and firm 
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equity risk, and we discuss how the firm’s operating assets risk con be correctly 
estimated from the pension plan risk and observed equity risk. We then derive the 
structure of estimation specification errors in measuring firm operating risk when 
pension risk is accounted for improperly. We analyze two circumstances: (1) that the 
entire pension plan, assets and liability is neglected in the estimation of operating 
asset risk and (2) that the values of pension assets and liabilities are correctly taken 
into account, but the risks of plan assets and liabilities are not. 
4.2 The derivation of firm’s operating asset risk  
Define OA as the value of operating assets, E as the value of equity, D as the 
value of debt, PA as the value of pension assets, PL as the value of pension liabilities, 
PS = PA –PL as the pension surplus, and L = D/E as the leverage ratio. Therefore,  
Assets = OA + PA = E + D + PL = Liabilities. 
We examine three cases:  
Correct Case: calculation of operating asset risk correctly incorporates both the value 
and the risk characteristic of the pension plan. 
][OA E D PA PLE D PA PL
OA OA OA OA
        
( ) ( )E D D PA PL PL
E D E PA S
OA OA OA OA
     

    
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Error case 1: calculation of operating asset risk ignores the pension plan’s value and 
risk altogether. 
ˆ
OA D E
D E
D E D E
   
 
 
Error case 2: calculation of risk includes the pension surplus, S, but neglects 
difference between βPA and βPL 
ˆˆ
OA E D
E D S
OA OA
  

 
 
The risk level of pension liability is similar to firm debt for firms with normal 
leverage ratio. The beta of debt can be quite low since debts of the firms are not often 
traded. Risk level of pension asset on the other hand has higher beta risk than the firm 
debt as the portion of pension assets are invested in equities.  In this paper, we 
assume the beta for both pension liability and firm’s debt to be 0.175 and the overall 
beta for pension assets is estimated to be 0.5671.  
                                                          
1
 The pension asset beta 0.567 is estimated by weighted average of aggregate pension assets for 
each asset category from 1996 to 2008(see appendix 1.2). The assumed beta in calculation is 1 for 
equity, 0.175 for bonds, 0.006 for cash and 0.15 for real estate (JFE, 2006). 
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Company
Pension 
asset
Pension 
liability
Pension 
Surplus 
(shortfall)
Market 
Cap of 
equity
Book 
value of 
debt
Operating asset 
(E+D-PA+PL)
Bank of Nova Scotia 5537 4414 1123 33040.86 18166 50083.8552
Thomson Reuters 3698 4175 -477 29451.17 6630 36,558
Canadian Imperial Bank 3794 3641 153 19454.98 42246 61547.98004
Canadian National Railway 13611 12326 1285 20966 7598 27278.996
Telus 5654.00 5243.00 411 11807.03 6348 17744.0282
Table 4
Selected company balance sheet information for 2008
Pension asset and pension liability are from  Compustat.  Market cap of equity and Book value of debt are obtained from 
Bloomberg.
Figures are in million of dolloars
 
Five big Canadian firms sorted by market capitalization are used in estimating 
the pension risks. By inspection of Table 4, 4 of the firms’ plans are overfunded and 
Thomas Reuters has a small pension deficit and pension liability is small relative to 
market capitalization.  
Company Equity beta
OA beta 
correct
OA beta 
error 1
Percent 
overestimate 
for error 1
OA beta error 2
Percent 
overestimate for 
error 2
Bank of Nova Scotia 0.527 0.374 0.412 10.17 0.417 11.594
Thomson Reuters 0.427 0.338 0.381 12.51 0.378 11.719
Canadian Imperial Bank 0.504 0.255 0.279 9.39 0.279 9.487
Canadian National Railway 0.504 0.233 0.417 79.19 0.428 84.091
Telus 0.616 0.344 0.462 34.41 0.469 36.345
Table 5
Estimated equity and operating asste betas for 2008
Beta of equity are estimated using CAPM, using data on five-year monthly stock return obtained from CRSP and the return on TSX index  as proxy 
for market. Beta of debt is assumed to be 0.175 through out the paper. Operating asset beta correct is the operation asset beta when correcly 
accounting for pension value and risk, Operating asset beta error  1 is the operating asset beta ignoring pension plan altogether, and Operating 
asset beta error 2 is the operating asset beta counting pension value but misrepresenting pension risk.
 
According to Table 5, the correct estimates of operating asset beta for these five 
firms are 0.374, 0.338, 0.255, 0.233 and 0.344, respectively. When commit error 1 is 
made, a flawed procedure ignores the pension plan altogether, we obtain the operating 
asset beta 0.412 0.381, 0.279, 0.417 and 0.462 respectively. The largest estimation 
error is for Canadian National Railway overestimated by 79%. The operating asset 
betas for the rest of the firms are overstated by between 10% and 35%. Error 2 is 
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present when pension value but not pension risk is incorporated in the calculation and 
the resulting betas are still significantly different from their correct value.  
Company
 Correct cost of 
capital estimate 
(%)
Cost of capital 
estimate error 1 
(%)
Percent  
overestimate 
error1
Cost of capital 
estimate error 2 
(%)
Percent  
overestimate 
error 2
Bank of Nova Scotia 6.335 6.606 4.280 6.644 4.546
Thomson Reuters 6.082 6.384 4.963 6.365 4.298
Canadian Imperial Bank 5.486 5.656 3.107 5.658 2.840
Canadian National Railway 5.328 6.642 24.648 6.723 24.123
Telus 6.120 6.964 13.777 7.011 13.620
Table 6
Estimated costs of capital for 2008
The cost of capital is estimated using the capital asset pricing model to estimate equity cost of capital, assuming a risk free rate of  3.67%/year 
and a market risk premium of  7.13%/year. 
 
The cost of capital can be overestimated if operating asset risk and pension plan 
risk are not recognized. Because the cost of capital is used as discount rate for 
operating projects, overestimating the cost of capital leads to overstated discount rate.  
We use 3.67% as risk free rate and 7.13 as market risk premium.
2
 (Table 6) For 
Canadian National Railway, the two error measurements of cost of capital yield an 
overestimate of about 25%. The correct cost of capital is 6.34%, 6.08%, 5.49% and 
6.12% for Bank of Nova Scotia, Thomson Reuters, Canadian imperial Bank and Telus 
respectively, while the standard approach yields 6.61%, 6.38%, 5.66% and 6.96 
respectively, for an over estimated range from 3% to 25%.  
                                                          
2
Risk free rate of 3.67% is calculated by taking the expected return of 10 year Canadian bond in 2008. 
7.13% is estimated by taking the expected return of the difference between TSX/SP index return and 
risk free rate. 
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4.3 The derivation of firm’s risk and pension risk 
In subsection 4.2, we demonstrated the extent of overestimation when pension 
risk and pension plan are not fully recognized by standard measure of the firm’s risk. 
In this subsection, we explore the question to the extent how strong the risk relation 
between pension risk and firm risk holds in practice. We incorporate company’s 
pension funding status into the risk of its equity. We test the hypothesis that a higher 
pension plan risk lead to a higher overall firm market risk and measure the magnitude 
of the relation between pension risk and firm risk. 
Define the capital risk, the firm risk is estimated as 
E D E D
E D
E D E D
    
 
 
The net pension risk is measured as  
pension PA PL
PA PL
E D E D
   
 
 
We fit the simple regression as follows: 
E D pensiona b      
The data is split into two periods: from 2000 to 2005 and from 2006 to 2008 for 
panel A and panel B respectively. Because the pension data for Canadian firms is 
fairly small, we run three different regressions in order to show the consistency of the 
results across different tests: (1) that uses Fama Macbeth regression (2) that use panel 
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data with fixed effects (3) that runs pooled cross sectional regression with industry 
dummies. 
The regression coefficients and their t-statistics are reported in Panel A and Panel 
B below. Panel A represents period of 2000 to 2005 and Panel B is for period of 2006 
to 2008. The pension liability beta is set to be 0.175 and 0.30 respectively.  
Panel A (2000-2005)
Regression test
Beta_PL=0.175 Beta_PL=0.3 Beta_PL=0.175 Beta_PL=0.3 Beta_PL=0.175 Beta_PL=0.3
Intercept 0.47798 0.48419 0.37380 0.38472 0.33514 0.32541
(-13.570) (13.340) (7.610) (7.830) (1.480) (1.430)
Pension risk 0.18729 0.03776 0.14157 0.01340 0.44136 0.63547
(1.040) (0.140) (0.760) (0.050) (1.820) (1.890)
R-squared 0.02300 0.02190 0.04990 0.04850 0.39550 0.39600
Intercept 0.46696 0.46950 0.41626 0.42705 0.55398 0.54662
(9.550) (9.400) (7.890) (8.110) (2.270) (2.240)
Pension risk 0.12278 -0.01061 0.15892 0.04523 0.47308 0.69537
(0.760) (-0.050) (0.840) (0.170) (1.920) (2.050)
Marketsharbysales 0.00001 0.00001 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
(4.030) (4.100) (-0.320) (-0.310) (0.400) (0.380)
Booktomark ratio -0.05860 -0.05581 -0.04828 -0.04825 -0.04407 -0.04485
(-2.330) (-2.350) (-2.900) (-2.890) (-2.600) (-2.650)
Return on investment 0.04183 0.05486 -0.03297 -0.03857 0.08457 0.08961
(0.180) (0.230) (-0.260) (-0.300) (0.690) (0.730)
R-square 0.29320 0.29190 0.07070 0.06900 0.41530 0.41620
obs 390 390 390 390 390 390
Fama Macbeth Time dummy Tme and industry dummies
 
Page 20 of 25 
 
Panel B (2006-2008)
Regression test
Beta_PL=0.175 Beta_PL=0.3 Beta_PL=0.175 Beta_PL=0.3 Beta_PL=0.175 Beta_PL=0.3
Intercept 0.638 0.635 0.601 0.600 0.558 0.557
(28.380) (32.210) (14.340) (14.280) (2.620) (2.620)
Pension risk -0.648 -0.906 -0.643 -0.864 -0.111 0.017
(-2.440) (-2.520) (-2.110) (-2.030) (-0.420) (0.050)
R-squared 0.020 0.021 0.022 0.021 0.706 0.705
Intercept 0.588 0.584 0.536 0.536 0.534 0.528
(5.230) (5.180) (9.030) (9.020) (3.360) (3.330)
Pension risk -0.637 -0.919 -0.751 -1.032 -0.050 0.064
(-3.610) (-3.340) (-2.520) (-2.490) (-0.190) (0.170)
Marketsharbysales 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(2.440) (2.480) (2.620) (2.630) (0.080) (0.040)
Booktomark ratio -0.095 -0.094 0.026 0.025 -0.048 -0.048
(-0.620) (-0.620) (0.820) (0.810) (-2.370) (-2.380)
Return on investment 0.813 0.823 0.665 0.668 0.347 0.349
(1.380) (1.380) (3.710) (3.730) (2.700) (2.710)
R-square 0.182 0.183 0.103 0.103 0.722 0.722
obs 258 258 258 258 258 258
Fama Macbeth Time dummy Tme and industry dummies
 
5. Estimation Results 
In Panel A, when we run overall regression between pension risk and firm risk 
pension liability beta is assumed to be 0.175, the estimated coefficients are 0.19, 0.14 
and 0.44 respectively for Fama Macbeth model, regression on time dummy and 
regression on both time and industry dummies. T-stat values are presented in the 
bracket under the coefficients. The coefficient on pension risk is only slightly 
different between FM and panel regression using fixed effects and not statistically 
significant. However, when we include industry dummies and estimate pooled cross 
section regression, the statistical significance increased substantially within 95% 
confidence level for both levels of assumed pension liability beta. When control 
variables are added into the regressions, the R-square has increased significantly. The 
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pension risk coefficient remains positive sign and it is statistically significant for 
regression test with time and industry classification dummies. Thus, for the period of 
2000 to 2005 at the expansion of pension and accounting regulation, when the equity 
return and long term interest rate are low, pension risk is positively correlated with 
firm risk: one unit increase in pension risk increases the firm risk by 0.44 to 0.64 units. 
The magnitude of the firm risk increase as a result of pension risk is determined by 
the assumed pension liability beta. The higher the assumed pension liability beta, the 
higher the firm risk when holding pension liability at the same level across 
companies.  
The outcome for Panel B (2006-2008) shows a different picture. The coefficient 
for pension risk is negative for the first two tests with strong statistical significance. 
For beta of pension liability being 0.3, the overall pension risk is -0.91and -0.86, and 
the t value is -2.5 and -2.03 respectively. Strong t value implies that the reverse 
relation between pension risk and firm risk is robust during the second period. The 
result might be counter intuitive and partly might be contributed to the financial crisis 
during this period highlighted by crackdown in equity market. As seen in Table 7, the 
beta of the firm has significantly increased since 2006, but the beta of pension has 
remained constant over time. During the extreme volatility in the market, a flight to 
quality occurred as investors rush to less risky, more liquid investment, such as bonds 
or government. In the economic environment where everyone panics, people tend to 
behave irrationally, so the market valuation is not tied to the fundamentals. Beta as a 
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measure of equity risk from CAPM cannot fully reflect the equity risk at that 
particular economic environment. Thus, further investigation in the relation between 
firm risk and pension risk is suggested. 
Table 7 mean of each beta 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Mean of Betas
2000-2008
βfirm
βPL=0.175
βPL=0.3
 
6. Conclusion and further improvements 
 This paper focuses on an important area where no Canadian pension literature has 
previously explored. It examined pension plan risk, as measured by pension asset risk 
minus pension liability risk, and its impact on the off balance sheet and non operating 
risk on equity risk measured beta from CAPM and the bias in estimation of the firm’s 
cost of capital for capital budgeting for 140 Canadian companies over two sub period 
2000-2005 and 2006-2008 respectively. The period of 2000-2005 has coincided with 
lower equity return and long term interest rate accompanied by tightening in pension 
accounting regulation. The majority of DB pension scheme of the companies in the 
sample have been under funded. Because of the low equity return, a trend has been 
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characterized by a marginal shift away from equities and towards bonds. By looking 
at Panel A, the third regression test including time and industry dummies along, our 
finding confirms the hypothesis that pension risk is positively related to firm’s risk. 
This suggests that pension risk does feed into firm equity and the market views the 
assets and liabilities of the company pension scheme as part of the assets and liability 
of the firm itself. However, the lack of robustness in the other two tests in Panel A 
casts doubt on the original hypothesis. This might be explained by lack of availability 
of Canadian pension data and number of firms in the sample are either inactive or 
trade very infrequently. When more pension data become available in Canada, further 
study can be improved by only considering frequently traded and active firm in the 
sample. During the second period 2006-2008 characterised by meltdown in equity 
market, market valuation tied to fundamentals could not fully reflect the picture 
because the market is based on the irrational behaviour of investors. We suggest 
further study on this particular period. 
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